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A large body of empirical research ﬁnds that a pair of regions within a country tends to trade 10 to 20 times as
much as an otherwise identical pair of regions across countries. In the context of the standard trade models,
the large “border eﬀect” is problematic, because it is consistent only with high elasticities of substitution
between goods and/or high unobserved national border barriers. I propose a resolution to this puzzle based
on vertical specialization, which occurs when regions or countries specialize only in particular stages of a
good’s production sequence. I develop a Ricardian model of intra-national and international trade, and show
how endogenous vertical specialization magniﬁes the eﬀects of border barriers such as tariﬀs. I calibrate the
model to match relative wages, trade shares, and vertical specialization for the U.S. and Canada. The model
implies a much smaller border barrier and border eﬀect than previous estimates.
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It is taken for granted that barriers to the ﬂow of goods, services, assets, and information continue
to fall with the passage of time. Virtually all of the data on these ﬂows support this presumption.
Despite this trend, however, there is a large body of empirical research that indicates that barriers
at national borders are still large. This research has found that a pair of regions within a country
tends to trade 10 to 20 times as much as an otherwise identical pair of regions across countries,
relative to what they would trade in the absence of barriers at the national border.1
These ﬁndings are known as the border eﬀect puzzle, because, in the context of the workhorse
models of international trade, the large border eﬀect can only be reconciled with parameters imply-
ing high elasticities of substitution between goods and/or high unobserved trade barriers between
countries.2 Consider, for example, the United States and Canada, a pair of nations with a free trade
agreement, with the world’s largest bilateral trade ﬂows, and whose border eﬀect has received the
most attention. One of the most theoretically consistent estimates of the border eﬀect for Canada is
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Their estimate, 10.5, implies that with an elasticity of ﬁve,
the tariﬀ equivalent of the barrier at the U.S.-Canada border is 48 percent. Existing measures of
tariﬀ rates and transport costs between the United States and Canada suggest that, taken together,
they are less than ﬁve percent; thus, unobservable border barriers need to be about 43 percent in
order to explain the border eﬀect!3 It seems diﬃcult to imagine barriers that high between the
1McCallum (1995) was the ﬁrst to ﬁnd this eﬀect. Other research includes that by Wei (1996), Helliwell (1998),
Anderson and Smith (1999), Nitsch (2000), Head and Mayer (2002), Evans (2003), Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), Chen (2004), and Combes et al (2005). Most of this research focuses on merchandise trade. Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2001) state that the “home bias in consumption” problem, i.e., the border eﬀect problem, is one of the six
major puzzles of open economy macroeconomics.
2The workhorse models include the monopolistic competition model, the Ricardian model, the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, as well as the models built around the Armington aggregator.
3The coeﬃcient estimate that underlies the calculation of the border eﬀect is the product of 1-the elasticity of
substitution multiplied by the natural log of the gross ad valorem tariﬀ equivalent of the border barrier. With an
elasticity of 8, the tariﬀ equivalent of the border barrier is 26 percent, implying an unobservable border barrier of 21
percent.
Baier and Bergstrand (2001) report that the overall gross c.i.f./f.o.b. factor - a measure of transportation costs
on imported goods - for Canada was 2.5 percent between 1986 and 1988. This is a reasonable proxy for its gross
c.i.f./f.o.b. factor with the United States given that 2/3 of its imports at that time were from the U.S. In addition,
data from the U.S. International Trade Commission indicate that U.S. tariﬀ collections on imports from Canada were
equivalent to 2 percent of imports (from Canada) in 1996.
1United States and Canada.4 Moreover, it seems diﬃcult to reconcile these high barrier numbers
with the presence of a highly integrated automobile market between the United States and Canada,
a market that accounts for about 3/10 of U.S.- Canada trade.
In this paper, I propose a resolution to the puzzle based on vertical specialization. Vertical spe-
cialization involves the interconnectedness of production processes in a sequential, vertical trading
chain stretching across multiple countries and regions, with each country or region specializing in
particular stages of a good’s production sequence. Previous research has documented the increasing
empirical importance of international vertical specialization.5 There is evidence as well as good
reason to expect that vertical specialization is more prevalent at the intra-national level.
I develop a model of intra-national and international trade with endogenous vertical special-
ization that draws from the model developed in Yi (2003).6 The core part of the model involves
Ricardian productivity-based comparative advantage with a continuum of goods in which each
good is produced in two stages. The primary extension beyond Yi (2003) is that the fundamental
geographic unit is a region within a country, rather than a country. For a special case of the model,
I derive an analytical expression for the border eﬀect and contrast it with the analogous expression
from a standard trade model in which production occurs in just one stage. When there is vertical
specialization, the border eﬀect is a power of the standard border eﬀect, where the power is increas-
ing in the share of ﬁrst stage goods used in second stage production. The special case facilitates
the intuition for how vertical specialization magniﬁes the eﬀects of national border barriers.
In the standard trade model, high border barriers imply a large border eﬀect — the ratio of
intra-national trade to international trade (normalized by the ratio under free trade) — via the
usual mechanism that the cost of imported goods is high, so households spend more on domestically
produced goods and less on imported goods. In a model with endogenous vertical specialization,
there are two additional, mutually reinforcing, mechanisms by which border barriers impact the
border eﬀect. The ﬁrst mechanism can be conveyed via the following intuition. Goods are produced
in multiple, sequential stages. Suppose that in the absence of border barriers, the United States
specializes in the odd-numbered stages and Canada specializes in the even-numbered stages. There
4Some authors, especially Helliwell (1998), contend that institutional forces reﬂecting national diﬀerences in tastes
and values can signiﬁcantly raise transactions costs for interactions between countries. Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004) survey estimates of the border barriers due to diﬀerences in language, currency, information, and security;
some of these estimates are large, but it is likely that these barriers are lower for U.S.-Canada interactions.
5See section 2.
6Yi (2003) shows that vertical specialization can help explain the growth of world trade.
2is a great deal of international “back and forth” or vertically specialized trade. Now, suppose a
border barrier between the United States and Canada is introduced. Now, every time the good-
in-process crosses the border, the barrier is imposed. The eﬀect of the barrier, then, is to raise
the cost of the ﬁnal good by a multiple of the barrier. This magniﬁed cost increase leads to a
larger reduction in international trade than would occur in the standard, one-stage-of-production,
model. In addition, a key insight from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), hereafter, AvW, is
that when international trade is relatively low, all else equal, intra-national trade is relatively high.
Consequently, the magniﬁcation eﬀect of vertical specialization on international trade works in the
opposite direction for intra-national trade, which increases by more than what would be implied by
the standard model. Hence, because of both larger intra-national trade, and smaller international
trade, the border eﬀect is larger.
The second mechanism can be conveyed by the following example. Suppose, at existing border
barriers, the lowest cost automobiles for U.S. consumers are produced in Canada, from U.S.-made
parts. That is, the cheapest production method involves engines, tires, and other parts produced
in the United States, and then exported to Canada where the parts are assembled into the auto-
mobile, which is then exported back to the United States. Also, suppose that the second cheapest
production method is for parts production and assembly to occur in the United States. Because
both production methods involve parts produced in the United States, the assembly stage is the
“marginal” production stage. Then the relevant border cost is not the cost relative to the total
cost of the good, but the cost relative to the cost of producing the marginal stage. Because this
cost is a fraction of the total cost of the good, yet the border barrier is applied to the total cost,
the “eﬀective” border cost is magniﬁed.
I then use the model to quantitatively assess the magnitude of border barriers and border
eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, I calibrate a two-country, two regions per country model to the United States
and Canada in 1990. I calibrate the key parameters — international trade costs and the mean
level of productivity — so that the model generates implications for Canadian wages, trade shares,
and vertical specialization that match the data. From these trade costs and productivity, border
barriers and the border eﬀect can be inferred. I ﬁnd that both the U.S.-Canada border barrier and
Canada’s border eﬀect are relatively small. When the relevant elasticity is ﬁve, the import-weighted
trade barrier is about 23 percent, and the border barrier is about 19 percent. This border barrier
generates a larger border eﬀect owing to the presence of vertical specialization, but the border eﬀect
is still not large — around ﬁve. The border barrier and border eﬀect numbers are less than one-half
3of those in AvW and other research.
Vertical specialization plays a key role in the quantitative results. Currently, Canada has a
good deal of international vertical specialization. Because the eﬀect of border barriers is magniﬁed
under vertical specialization, the only way to explain the data in the context of the model is for
at least some goods to face very low border barriers. Based on the importance of multinationals
in U.S.-Canada trade, I specify that one-third of t h eg o o d sf a c el o wt r a d eb a r r i e r s .B e c a u s et h e s e
goods already face low barriers, the increase in international trade predicted by the model from the
elimination of border barriers is more limited — which implies a smaller border eﬀect.
There is a broader way to interpret the role of vertical specialization. The key is that it is
endogenous and responds to changes in border barriers. The source of the endogeneity is that
goods are produced in sequential, tradable stages, and regions vary in their eﬃciency in producing
them. In the usual trade models, production occurs in just one stage. Of course, this is not taken
to be literally true; rather, the production function can be thought of as a “reduced form” amalgam
of a multiple stage process. However, the maintained assumption is that the nature of production
— the mapping of production stages to regions, for example — is invariant to changes in trade costs.
In other words, changes in border barriers may alter which country or region produces the (entire)
good, but there is no change in the underlying nature of production. For many research questions
this assumption is appropriate. However, in the context of the border eﬀect puzzle, this paper
shows that the assumption leaves out forces that are quantitatively important. The reduced form
production function does change in response to changes in trade costs; this is the source of the
magniﬁcation eﬀect.
There are several related papers on explaining the border eﬀect. Evans (2003b) and Chaney
(2005) focus on ﬁxed costs of exporting.7 Chaney’s framework also includes ﬁrm heterogeneity; both
forces help deliver a higher trade elasticity with respect to trade barriers than would be implied by
the elasticity of substitution alone. Hillberry (2002) examines aggregation bias and compositional
change. Head and Mayer (2002) focus on appropriately measuring internal distance, Combes et
al (2005) examine the eﬀects of business and social networks, and Hillberry and Hummels (2005)
emphasize the importance of co-location. Rossi-Hansberg (2004) presents a model with intermediate
and ﬁnal goods, an agglomeration externality, and endogenous ﬁrm location. The latter drives
endogenous changes in productivities, which also helps to magnify the eﬀects of border barriers.
Most of these explanations are at least partially successful in reconciling large border eﬀects with
7Hummels and Klenow (2004) provide evidence consistent with a ﬁxed cost of exporting framework.
4relatively small border barriers.
Section 2 provides empirical motivation for applying vertical specialization to this problem. It
shows that, for the U.S., vertical specialization at the state level is more widespread than at the
country level. Section 3 presents the model and intuition on how vertical specialization magniﬁes
border barriers into a large border eﬀect. This is followed by the calibration and solution method.
Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Vertical Specialization at the State Level
In this section, I provide evidence suggesting that intra-national vertical specialization is quantita-
tively important. First, I deﬁne vertical specialization. In previous research, D. Hummels, J. Ishii,
D. Rapoport, and I have documented the increasing importance of international vertical special-
ization in OECD and other countries.8 In order to accommodate regions as the basic geographic
unit, I modify the deﬁnition from Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001):
1. Goods are produced in multiple, sequential stages.
2. Two or more regions provide value-added in the good’s production sequence.
3. At least one region must use imported inputs in its stage of the production process, and some
of the resulting output must be exported.
In this context, imports and exports refer to shipments from one region to another; in particular,
these ﬂows can occur within a country. Figure 1 illustrates an example of vertical specialization
involving three regions. Region 1 produces intermediate goods and exports them to region 2.
Region 2 combines the imported intermediates with other inputs and value-added to produce a
ﬁnal good (or another intermediate in the production chain). Finally, region 2 exports some of its
output to region 3. If either the imported intermediates or exports are absent, then there is no
vertical specialization.
Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (HIY) develop two vertical specialization measures. Again, I mod-








8See Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), and Yi (2003).
5where k and i denote region and good, respectively.
Ideally, VS ki would be calculated at the level of individual goods, and then aggregated up.
These data do not exist, at either the country or regional level. HIY relied on national input-
output tables, which provide industry-level data on imported intermediates, gross output, and
exports.9 These tables are not widely available at the sub-national level. However, several U.S.
states, including Hawaii and Washington, have constructed (survey-based) input-output tables.
Table 1 lists vertical specialization in merchandise exports, expressed as a fraction of total
merchandise exports, in these two states for selected years. (The Washington tables have not been
constructed since 1987.) For comparison, the table also lists vertical specialization for the entire
U.S. and for Canada. The table shows that vertical specialization at the state level is considerably
larger than at the national level. Also, in both states vertical specialization has been growing over
time.
The tables for Washington have an added feature in that they distinguish between domestic ex-
ports, that is, exports to other states within the U.S., and international exports. They distinguish
between domestic and international imported inputs, as well. Consequently, I am able to compute
four types of vertical specialization, according to whether imported inputs are from domestic or
international sources and whether the exports are to domestic or international destinations: Inputs
are imported from domestic sources and (some of) the output is exported to domestic destinations
(DD); inputs are imported from foreign sources and the output is exported to domestic destina-
tions (FD); inputs are imported from domestic destinations and the output is exported to foreign
destinations (DF); and inputs are imported from foreign sources and the output is exported to
foreign destinations (FF). FF is the vertical specialization that HIY document (and will be referred
to as “international” vertical specialization later in this paper). Figure 2 presents the data on the
four types of vertical specialization, expressed as a share of total vertically specialized merchan-
dise exports, for 1963 and 1987. The ﬁgure shows that the DD type of vertical specialization is
the most common, but also that over time the DD vertical specialization declined signiﬁcantly,
while both types of vertical specialization involving foreign imported inputs (FD and FF) increased
considerably.
9An additional advantage of using input-output tables is they facilitate measuring the indirect import content of
exports. Inputs may be imported, for example, and used to produce an intermediate good that is itself not exported,
but rather, used as an input to produce a good that is. See Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001).
6The data presented above are consistent with the idea that vertical specialization is important
in understanding the border eﬀect. Trade ﬂows between countries are subject to national border
barriers; consequently, opportunities for international vertical specialization are more limited, but
opportunities for intra-national vertical specialization are greater. Hence, the existence of national
border barriers should imply that regions have higher levels of vertical specialization than countries,
all else equal.
3 The Model
In this section, I lay out the model and describe the intuition for how vertical specialization can
magnify the eﬀects of border barriers. The model is a Ricardian model of trade in which trade and
specialization patterns are determined by relative technology diﬀerences across countries. It draws
from Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Yi (2003), both of which are generalizations and extensions of
the celebrated Dornbusch, Fischer, Samuelson (1977, hereafter, DFS) continuum-of-goods Ricardian
model.10
The basic geographic unit is a region. Countries consist of more than one region. Countries have
“border” barriers, but regions do not. Each region possesses technologies for producing goods along
a [0,1] continuum. Each good is produced in two stages. Both stages are tradable. Consequently,
there are I2 possible production patterns, where I is the total number of regions, for each good on
the continuum. The model determines which production pattern or patterns occur in equilibrium.
3.1 Technologies and Firms





1(z)θ1 z ∈ [0,1] (2)
where Ai
1(z) is region i’s total factor productivity associated with stage-1 good z,a n dli
1(z) and
mi
1(z) are region i’s labor and intermediate inputs used to produce yi
1(z). The share of intermediates
in production is θ1. y1(z) has two uses: it is used as an input into the production of itself (mi
1(z)) or
the stage-2 good z. mi
1(z) captures the idea that corn is needed to produce corn, or, more generally,
10In all three models, changes in trade occur along the extensive margin. Hillberry and Hummels (2005) provide
detailed micro-evidence supporting this feature.
7the circular nature of input and output.11









1(z)θ2 z ∈ [0,1] (3)
where xi
1(z) is region i’s use of y1(z) for stage-2 production, Ai
2(z) is region i’s total factor produc-
tivity associated with stage-2 good z,a n dli
2(z) is region i’ sl a b o ru s e di np r o d u c i n gyi
2(z).T h e
share of intermediates for this stage is θ2.
When either stage-1 or stage-2 goods cross regional or national borders, they incur iceberg
transport costs. Speciﬁcally, if 1 unit of either stage is shipped from region i to region j,t h e n
1/(1+dij) < 1 units arrive in region j. The gross ad valorem tariﬀ equivalent of this transport cost
is 1+dij. There is an additional iceberg cost, the national border barrier (1 + bij). This barrier is
a stand-in for tariﬀ rates, border-speciﬁc transport costs, as well as other barriers associated with
regulations, time, and national culture that are relevant for international trade.12 Consequently,
I assume the gross border barrier exceeds one only when regions i and j are located in diﬀerent
countries.
In terms of the number of countries and goods, the most general Ricardian framework is that
developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002, EK). I adopt a key part of the framework, which is the use
of the Frechét distribution as the probability distribution of total factor productivities:
F(A)=e−TA−n
(4)
The mean of A is increasing in T. n is a smoothness parameter that governs the heterogeneity
of the draws from the productivity distribution. The larger is n, the lower the heterogeneity or
variance of A. EK show that n plays the same role in their model as σ−1,w h e r eσ is the elasticity of
substitution between goods, in the monopolistic competition or Armington aggregator-based trade
models.13
11The ﬁrst stage of production in this model diﬀers from that in Yi (2003) in its inclusion of intermediates. This
facilitates matching both gross production and trade, and value-added (GDP). Eaton and Kortum (2002) employ an
analogous input-output structure, although it is at the aggregate level.
12To the extent the barrier includes tariﬀs, I assume that tariﬀ revenue is “thrown in the ocean.”
13The Frechét distribution facilitates a straightforward solution of the EK model in a many-country world with non-
zero border barriers. Unfortunately, such a straightforward solution does not carry over in my multi-stage framework.
This is because my framework requires two draws from the Frechét distribution. Neither the sum nor the product of
Frechét distributions has a Frechét distribution. I thank Sam Kortum for pointing this out to me.
8Firms maximize proﬁts taking prices as given. Speciﬁcally, in each period, they hire labor,









1(z) is the factory gate price of yi









assuming the cheapest source of stage-1 inputs is region j. pi
2(z) is the factory gate price of yi
2(z).
3.2 Households




subject to the budget constraint:
1 Z
0
pi(z)ci(z)dz = wiLi (8)
where ci(z) is consumption of good z,a n dpi(z) is the price, inclusive of transport and border






2(z)),w h e r e1+τi
2(z) is the total trade cost incurred in shipping
the stage-2 good z from its production location to region i.
The EK model has an input-output production structure, which implies vertical specialization, and leads generally
to more trade ﬂows than in a model without this structure. However, this structure is invariant to changes in trade
barriers, which plays a role in the result that the elasticity of trade ﬂows with respect to trade barriers is essentially
the same as in the standard trade model. This invariance in production structure to changes in trade barriers is also
true for the nested CES frameworks that are commonly used in the computable general equilibrium literature.
14I assume there are no transport costs for the stage 1 goods used as intermediates to produce more stage 1 goods.
93.3 Equilibrium
All factor and goods markets are characterized by perfect competition. The following market



























1(z) is the total trade cost incurred by shipping the stage-1 good from its production










If these conditions hold, then exports equal imports, i.e., trade is balanced for all regions. I
now deﬁne the equilibrium of this model:
















,z∈ [0,1],i=1 ,...I, such that the ﬁrst order
conditions to the households’ maximization problem 7, the ﬁrst order conditions to the ﬁrms’ max-
imization problems 5 and 6, as well as the market clearing conditions 9,10, and 11, are satisﬁed.
3.4 Border Barriers, Vertical Specialization, and Border Eﬀects
Under free trade and zero transport costs, there will be complete specialization. Each stage of each
good will be produced by only one region. Intra-national and international trade will occur so that
agents will be able to consume all goods. Under either transport costs or border barriers, complete
specialization may no longer occur. A stage of a good may be produced in more than one region.
If the transport costs and border barriers are high enough, autarky will occur, and each region will
produce every stage of every good.
As deﬁned in section 2, vertical specialization occurs whenever a good crosses more than one
regional or national border while it is in process. In the context of the model, a necessary condition





1(z)=0 ,a n ds i m i l a r l yf o rl
i
2(z).
10productive in the ﬁrst stage of production and another region to be relatively more productive in
the second stage. Under free trade and zero transport costs, if relative wages are “between” these
relative productivities, then this necessary condition is also suﬃcient.
3.4.1 Border Eﬀects in the Standard Model
To demonstrate how vertical specialization can magnify border barriers into relatively large border
eﬀects, I ﬁrst develop an analytical relation between border barriers and border eﬀects for a special
case of the model with two countries, two regions per country, one stage of production, no interme-
diate goods, and zero transport costs. This is just the DFS model extended to include two regions
per country. To facilitate the discussion, I consider a symmetric case. I assume that the regions in
each country have the same labor endowment and their (total factor) productivities are drawn from
the same distribution. This implies that wages and GDPs are equalized between regions within a
country.
A country’s productivity for a good is deﬁned as the maximum productivity (of that good) across
the two regions: Ah(z)=m a x [ Ah1(z),A h2(z)],w h e r eh denotes the home country. Without loss of
generality, the goods can then be arranged in descending order of the ratio of home productivity
to foreign productivity, so that Ar(z)=
Ah(z)
Af(z) is declining in z. International imports by the home
country (which equals exports) is given by:
(1 − zh)whLh (12)
where zh is the cutoﬀ z that separates home and foreign production for the home market. The
home country produces all goods on the interval [0,zh] and imports all goods on the interval [zh,1].
whLh is home country GDP. See Figure 3. The foreign country produces all goods on the interval
[zf,1] and imports all goods on the interval [0,zf]; consequently, foreign international imports is




This follows from the symmetry assumption about each of the two regions. Under free trade,
intra-national trade is equal to 25 percent of GDP.





11where Intra refers to intranational trade, Inter refers to international trade, the subscript b refers
to border barriers, and the subscript 0 refers to free trade. It is a double ratio - the ratio of
intra-national trade under border barriers to intra-national trade under free trade divided by the
corresponding ratio for international trade. The border eﬀect can also be thought of as the ratio of
intra-national trade to international trade under border barriers relative to what that ratio would





(1 − zb)/(1 − z0)
(15)
where the superscript h has been suppressed for convenience. In the standard one-stage model,
then, the denominator of the border eﬀect is (1−zb)/(1−z0) and the numerator is given by zb/z0.
At this point, I make a further symmetry assumption, which is that the regions across countries
are also identical in terms of both labor endowments and productivities. This assumption implies
that wages and GDPs are equalized across countries, and relative wages and GDPs (across countries)
are invariant to border barriers. Assuming the productivities follow a Frechét distribution, the











where Ar(z) can also be interpreted as the fraction of goods z where the home productivity relative
to the foreign productivity is at least A.16 As discussed above, n is analogous to an elasticity in
that a larger n implies a ﬂatter or more “elastic” Ar(z). In the appendix, I show that the solution




It is easy to see that under free trade, zh
0 = z
f
0 =0 .5; international exports and imports equal
one-half of GDP. The denominator of the border eﬀect (international trade under border barriers
divided by international trade under free trade) is:
2
1+( 1+b)n (18)
This is clearly decreasing in the border barrier; through international trade alone, the greater the
border barrier, the greater the border eﬀect. Note that the higher the elasticity n, the greater
the eﬀect of the border barrier on international trade. Consider an example in which b = .1,a n d
16See footnote 15 in EK (2002).
12n =1 0 . Then, zb = .722 (see Figure 4) and the denominator of the border eﬀect = .56,w h i c h
means that when border barriers are 10 percent, international trade is 44 percent less than it would
be under free trade.
The numerator of the border eﬀect (intra-national trade under border barriers divided by intra-
national trade under free trade) is:
2(1 + b)n
1+( 1+b)n (19)
This is increasing in the border barrier — as the barrier between countries increases, intra-
national trade increases. The reason for this is essentially the idea that specialization implies that
goods must be traded somewhere. If they are not traded internationally, they will typically be
traded intra-nationally. This is a key insight from AvW. More speciﬁcally, consider a home country
consumer in one of the regions. Under border barriers, the fraction of goods purchased from home
producers increases. Because the two regions within the home country are symmetric, this implies
that the fraction of goods purchased from the other home region’s producers, that is, intra-national
trade, increases. In the above example, the fraction of goods purchased from home rises from 0.5
under free trade to 0.722 under barriers, an increase of 44 percent. (Figure 5). Based on the logic
just presented, this increase equals the increase in intra-national trade following the imposition of
barriers. The numerator of the border eﬀect =1 .44.
Combining the numerator and denominator yields the overall border eﬀect, which is given by:
(1 + b)n (20)
This expression is quite intuitive. In a simple, symmetric case with two countries, two regions per
country, the log of the border eﬀect is approximately the elasticity multiplied by the border barrier.
In our special example, the border eﬀect =2 .59.
3.4.2 Border Eﬀects in the Vertical Specialization Model
With the vertical specialization model, deriving analytical expressions for the border eﬀect is con-
siderably more diﬃcult. To provide insight into the model, Iw o r kw i t has p e c i a lc a s e .I ti n t r o d u c e s
two stages of production and vertical specialization in a somewhat awkward way, but it has the
virtue of yielding an analytical expression for the border eﬀect. I assume that the ﬁrst stage of
production is produced in the country that ultimately consumes the second stage good; the sec-
ond stage production location is determined by the model. Thus, if an automobile is going to be
purchased by a U.S. resident, the parts and components are assumed to be produced in the United
13States, while ﬁnal assembly can occur either in the United States or Canada. This assumption
ensures there is vertical specialization with only one set of Frechét productivities compared across
regions and countries for each good, which means much of the analysis from the previous sub-section
can be applied here.
For goods consumed by the home country, the two possible production methods at the country
level are denoted by HH and HF,w h e r eHF means that the ﬁrst stage of production occurs in
the Home country and the second stage of production occurs in the Foreign country. Note that
production method HF involves international vertical specialization: the foreign country imports
inputs and exports its resulting output. Similarly, for goods consumed by the foreign country,
the two possible production methods are denoted by FF and FH, where international vertical
specialization occurs with FH. I continue to assume that there are four identically sized regions;
moreover, each region’s productivities for both stages of production are drawn from the same
distribution.17 I also assume that the share of intermediates in stage-1 and stage-2 production is
identical, θ1 = θ2 = θ.
If the goods are arranged in descending order of the ratio of home to foreign productivity of
stage 2 production, then the analysis in the previous sub-section applies. In particular, zh denotes
the cutoﬀ that separates home and foreign production of stage 2 goods for the home market.
International imports for the home country is now given by (1 + θ)(1 − zh)wL;i n t r a - n a t i o n a l





































term in the exponent. The term
shows clearly that (endogenous) vertical specialization magniﬁes the eﬀects of border barriers.





exponent. The ﬁrst mechanism is the multiple
17This latter assumption means that under free trade, the production method HH has four ex ante equally likely
production methods distinguished by region: stage 1 can be produced in either of the two home countries’ regions
and likewise for stage 2 production. Two of these production methods involve intra-national vertical specialization.
14border crossing force. With the HF production process, the ﬁrst stage encounters a border barrier
twice; recall that the share of stage-1 goods in stage-2 production is θ. Consequently, the total eﬀect
of the barrier is 1+θ. The second mechanism draws from the fact that the tradeoﬀ between HH
and HF hinges on the second stage of production. This stage is the “marginal” production process.
More generally, in a model with multiple stages of production, the marginal production process
could be the production process for one particular stage, while in a standard model, the marginal
production process is always the production process for the entire good. Hence, the relevant border
cost is not the cost relative to the total cost of producing the good, but the cost relative to the
stage-2 cost. This explains the 1 − θ term.
Another way to explain the exponent is via the following decomposition. In the HF production
process, the ﬁrst stage encounters a border barrier when it is shipped to the foreign country. That
barrier is equivalent to a barrier on the second stage of production of (1+b)
θ
1−θ.Ab o r d e rb a r r i e ri s
encountered again when the ﬁnal good is shipped back to the home country from the foreign country.
The border barrier is applied to the entire good. Consequently, a barrier of 1+b i m p o s e do nt h e
entire HF-produced good is eﬀectively a barrier of (1+b)
1
1−θ on the second stage of production.18
The total eﬀect is the product of these two forces. If the border barrier rises, the cost of producing
(internationally) vertically specialized goods rises by a multiple of the barrier.
There are two more points worth making. The greater the share of stage-1 goods used in stage-2
production, that is, the greater the fraction of the ﬁnal good that crosses the border multiple times,
i.e., θ, the larger the magniﬁcation eﬀect. Also, the key to the magniﬁcation eﬀect is that vertical
specialization is endogenous; in the model, there are alternative, non (internationally) vertically
specialized production processes that become relatively more eﬃcient as border barriers rise. That
the model delivers changes in the nature of production and specialization as barriers change is what
gives the model “kick” relative to the frameworks employed by AvW or EK, for example.
Using the same numerical example as in the previous sub-section with b = .1 and n =1 0 ,a n d
setting θ =0 .5, Figure 6 shows that international trade falls to only about 1/10 of its value under
free trade. Intra-national trade rises by a little less than a factor of 2. The overall border eﬀect
is 17.45, which is almost seven times larger than in the standard model. A given border barrier
generates a much larger border eﬀect in a model with endogenous vertical specialization.
Increasingly, countries apply tariﬀs only to the value-added that occurs abroad. These arrange-
ments tend to arise speciﬁcally to increase opportunities for vertical specialization. When tariﬀs
18The second force is closely related to the forces highlighed by the eﬀective rate of protection literature.
15are applied only to value-added, no part of the ﬁnal good is taxed more than once. However, from
the above discussion, it should be clear that even under value-added tariﬀs, the multiplicative eﬀect
still holds. This is because stage 2 is still the marginal stage, and even if a tariﬀ is levied on the
ﬁnal good only once, that tariﬀ is still a multiple of the barrier applied to the second stage. To





. See the appendix for the
derivation of the border eﬀect in this case.
The above discussion has focused on a special case of the model. In the general case, in which
the locations of both stage-2 and stage-1 production are endogenous, the margins described by the
special case, i.e., HH vs. HF, will arise only for a fraction of the goods. For the other goods, the
margins will not involve the two forces described above. One way of thinking about the model,
then, is that it is a combination of the special case with its magniﬁed border eﬀect and other cases
in which the border eﬀect is the standard one. Consequently, in the general model, the overall
eﬀect is magniﬁed, but the extent of the magniﬁcation is smaller than what is given by (23).
Summarizing, the discussion above suggests the following interpretation of the relation between
vertical specialization and the border eﬀect. In a world with vertical specialization, border barriers
lead to a larger decrease in international trade, and a larger increase in intra-national trade, than
what would be implied by a standard trade model, as indicated by (22). International trade
decreases by more because of the two mechanisms discussed above: 1) the back-and-forth aspect of
vertical specialization implies that at least some stages of the good are aﬀected multiple times by
border barriers and 2) the barrier is applied to the entire good, but the marginal unit of production
is a single stage, whose cost is just a fraction of the cost of the entire good. Because international
trade decreases by more, intra-national trade increases by more; moreover, the ensuing increase in
regional vertical specialization also adds to intra-national ﬂows. Overall, the presence of vertical
specialization gives rise to a larger border eﬀect from a given border barrier than in the standard
model.
4 Model Calibration and Solution
I now assess the quantitative importance of vertical specialization in the border eﬀect puzzle. One
possible exercise would be to take the estimated border eﬀects from the literature as facts to be
explained, and calculate the border barrier in the vertical specialization model that generates that
border eﬀect. The goal would be to demonstrate that in a model with vertical specialization, a
16smaller border barrier is needed to generate a given border eﬀect.19 However, this exercise is not
completely appropriate, because the estimated border eﬀects are model-speciﬁc. Consequently, I
use my model to calculate both border barriers and border eﬀects for U.S.-Canada trade.
I employ a two country model with two regions per country. This is probably realistic for
Canada, as the United States is by far its largest trading partner. This is one reason why I focus
on Canada’s (as opposed to the United States’) border eﬀect.20 The other reason is that Canada’s
border eﬀect has generated the most attention in the empirical literature.
In three successively more detailed simulations, I parameterize the model, and then solve for the
overall international trade barriers τUS−Canada and productivities TCanada to match relative wages,
trade, and/or vertical specialization between the U.S. and Canada in 1990. Relative wages and
trade are key variables to which all other price and quantity variables are linked. I choose 1990,
because McCallum’s original paper focuses on that year, and because the latest year for which
the OECD has Canada input-output tables — the source of the international vertical specialization
numbers — is 1990. Then under diﬀerent assumptions about transport costs, I solve the model when
there are no border barriers, which enables me to generate an estimate of Canada’s border eﬀect.
This section describes these steps in detail.
4.1 Calibration
I ﬁrst describe the parameters and variables that are drawn directly from the data. Second, I
discuss the wage, trade, and vertical specialization data and their values that are used to pin down
the key parameters, the τ’s and the T’s.
4.1.1 Parameters and Variables from the Data
Table 1 in EK indicates that, in 1990, human-capital adjusted manufacturing labor in the United
States was 11.5 times greater than in Canada. The unadjusted labor force was about 10.2 times
greater. I set Canada’s labor force to be 0.09 of that of the United States.21 In the ﬁrst two
19Indeed, in previous versions of this paper, I conducted such an exercise. The main result is that the vertical
specialization model can generate the same border eﬀect with a border barrier about half as large as would be required
in a standard model.
20Note that AvW estimated a two-country model and a multi-country model and the estimates and border eﬀect
implications are quite similar.
21Note that I assume that labor is not mobile between regions within a country. However, the assumptions on
wages and on barriers between these regions render this assumption innocuous.
17simulations, the regions within each country are assumed to be symmetric. In the third simulation,
I divide Canada into two asymmetric regions, Ontario-Quebec (OQ) and the rest of Canada (ROC).
From Statistics Canada’s labor force survey estimates, employment in OQ in 1990 was 63.7 percent
of total employment.22 Consequently, OQ’s labor force is set to 0.057 of the U.S. labor force, and
ROC’s labor force is set to 0.033 of the U.S. labor force.
I focus on a single value of the heterogeneity in productivity parameter n, 4, which corresponds
to an elasticity of substitution in monopolistic competition or Armington aggregator models of 5.
(Hereafter, I refer to the elasticity-equivalent of the parameter.) This elasticity is identical across
regions and countries. This value is on the low end of the estimates reported by EK; their primary
estimates range from n =3 .6 to n =1 2 .86. Most of AvW’s results are presented for elasticities of 5,
8,a n d10. One reason I choose a lower elasticity is because of the result from the previous section
that, under vertical specialization, the responsiveness of trade to border barriers depends on both
the elasticity of substitution and the “magniﬁcation eﬀect”. Consequently, existing estimates of
the substitution elasticity may be upwardly biased. In some of the sensitivity analysis, I examine
an elasticity of 10.
Two other key parameters are the intermediate shares, θ1 and θ2.W h e n θ1 = θ2 = θ,i t
can be shown that the value-added/gross output ratio is 1 − θ.T h e ﬁrst version of the OECD
input-output tables, published in 1995, indicate that for Canada in 1990, the value-added/gross
output ratio for merchandise was 39 percent. The latest OECD STAN database indicates that the
value-added/gross output ratio in 1990 was 37 percent. I use the average of these two numbers and
set both θ1 and θ2 = 0.62.
Distance has been shown time and again to matter signiﬁcantly in explaining bilateral trade
patterns. Distance will be my proxy for transportation costs d. There are three transportation
costs to calibrate, within Canada costs, within U.S. costs, and between Canada-and-U.S. costs.
Using the province-to-province, state-to-province, and state-to-state trade ﬂow data, as well as the
corresponding distance data, from AvW, I construct trade-weighted average measures of internal
distance for Canada and for the United States, as well as of the distance between Canada and the
United States.23 I ﬁnd that internal distances within Canada and within the United States are
22See Statistics Canada Table 282-0002.
23I include within state and within province distance as part of the calculations. Including these distances is
important, because the single largest destination for shipments for most states and provinces is itself. Head and
Mayer (2002) present a detailed discussion of measuring distance. Their main point is that the usual measures of
internal distance tend to over-estimate eﬀective distance, because they ignore the fact that that ﬁrms endogenously
18about the same: 639 kilometers and 748 kilometers, respectively. In addition, the distance between
the United States and Canada is calculated to be 1167 kilometers.
The fact that the two internal distances are very similar is convenient, because it suggests
that the within-country transport costs are similar, and because of the following theoretical point
made by AvW: A proportionate increase in transport costs in all regions (including costs within
regions) does not aﬀect trade ﬂows. This is because what matters for bilateral trade ﬂows is the
bilateral barrier relative to the barriers with the rest of the world that each country faces. If all
transport costs, including within-region costs, increase proportionately, then the relative barrier is
unaﬀected. Hence, with no loss of generality, I set the within-country transport costs to be zero,
and I re-interpret the international transport costs as costs relative to the within-country costs.
These costs must now be speciﬁed. The empirical literature provides numerous estimates of the
tariﬀ equivalents of distance. EK estimate for OECD countries the eﬀects of distance on trade using
a step function in which the eﬀects of distance are constant within each of six intervals, but diﬀer
between intervals. The smallest distance interval is 375 miles, which is greater than the diﬀerence
between internal and cross-country distance for the United States and Canada. In EK, the marginal
distance cost of going from a distance interval of [0, 375] miles to [375, 750] miles is 15.0 percent
under an elasticity of ﬁve. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimate the distance barrier between
the United States and Canada to be 29 percent when the elasticity is ﬁve. However, as noted above
f o rb o r d e re ﬀects, the estimates of trade costs owing to distance are model-speciﬁc. As my model
is diﬀerent from EK and AvW, it should produce diﬀerent estimates of distance costs.24
An important point is that the larger the measure of international distance, i.e., the larger the
international transport cost, the smaller the implied border barrier. This is because solving the
choose to locate near each other. I follow an approach given on p. 11 of Head and Mayer (2002) in measuring internal
distance of a province or state as 0.67 ×
s
area/π. The resulting number for Canada is close to the result obtained
in a very detailed calculation by Helliwell and Verdier (2001).
24In addition, AvW’s estimates of trade costs due to distance could be biased upwards for the following reason.
For measuring within U.S. trade ﬂows, they relied on the 1993 Commodity Flow Survey (CFS). These ﬂows include
both merchandise and wholesale shipments. Often, the wholesale shipments are shipments from the warehouse to the
retailer, and hence, should not be counted. Unfortunately, it is not possible to separate these data out. Consequently,
AvW apply an aggregate shrinkage factor to the total commodity ﬂows to match that number with U.S. gross output
in merchandise. However, wholesale shipments tend to be short distance, while merchandise shipments tend to be
long distance. This means that the short-distance shipments are reduced too little and the long-distance shipments
are reduced too much, leading to an upward bias in the (absolute) magnitude of the distance/trade relationship. I
thank David Hummels for pointing this out to me.
19model will generate an implied international trade cost τ.Because (1 + τ)=( 1+d)(1 + b),t h e
larger is d,t h es m a l l e rw i l lb eb. In other words, the more of the (normalized) intra-national to
international trade ratio that can be attributed to distance, the less that can be attributed to the
border barrier.
Consequently, I adopt what I think is a conservative approach. In the baseline analysis, I set the
international (relative to intra-national) distance cost to be 5 percent. This number is considerably
smaller than the AvW number and the number that would be implied by other papers based on the
U.S. and Canada intra-national and international distances. To the extent this is an underestimate
of the true U.S.-Canada distance cost, I will overestimate the border barrier, the border eﬀect,
and the increase in trade that will result if the border barriers are eliminated. In some sensitivity
analyses, I examine the consequences of a 10 percent distance cost.
In the second and third simulations, I introduce heterogeneous trade costs across goods by
specifying that some of the goods face low trade barriers, while the remainder face high trade
barriers. There are two main motivations for introducing this heterogeneity. First, much of the
empirical research that estimates industry-level border eﬀects ﬁnds considerable variation in these
border eﬀects across industries. See, for example, Helliwell (1998) and Hillberry (2002). Second,
the data show that at least half of U.S.-Canada trade is mediated by multinationals; in particular,
trade involving Canadian aﬃliates of U.S. parents accounted for 45 percent of U.S. (merchandise)
imports from Canada and 48 percent of U.S. merchandise exports to Canada in 1990. In addition,
another 10 percent of U.S. trade involves U.S. aﬃliates of Canadian parents. It is plausible that
multinational-mediated trade faces lower trade costs than arms length trade.
Five key industries — motor vehicles, primary metals, fabricated metals, non-electrical machin-
ery, and electrical machinery (including electronics) — account for most of the multinational trade.
For example, in 1990, they accounted for 84.5 percent of all U.S. imports from Canadian aﬃliates.25
These industries accounted for 39 percent of all Canadian manufacturing shipments in 1990. Man-
ufacturing, in turn, accounts for about 80 percent of all merchandise shipments. In addition, the
mining industry, which for years has consisted primarily of petroleum production and export to
the United States, does not appear to face large trade costs. Taken together, the evidence suggests
that at least one-third of the goods that Canada produces face low barriers. That is the number I
25These industries also appear to be playing a key role in vertical specialization, as they accounted for 85 percent
of U.S. manufactured exports to Canada “shipped for further manufacture.” This provides more support for the
presumption that these industries face low trade costs.
20use. In the simulation involving OQ and ROC, I use this number for each province. The ﬁve above-
mentioned manufacturing industries are dominant in OQ, accounting for 88 percent of Canada’s
shipments, while mining is dominant in ROC.26
4.1.2 Variables Used to Calibrate Trade Costs and Productivities
Wages
According to EK, Canada’s manufacturing wage was 0.88 of the U.S. wage in 1990. In the third
simulation, in which I divide Canada into OQ and ROC, I assume that both regions have the same
wage.
Trade shares
The average of Canada’s export share of merchandise GDP in 1990 from the OECD input-output
tables and from the most recent vintage of the OECD’s STAN database for Canada is 0.91.27 In
the simulation with OQ and ROC, I use the most recent OECD STAN data for Canada, and
the Statistics Canada publications “Interprovincial Trade in Canada, 1984-1996,” and “Provincial
Gross Domestic Product by Industry, 1984-1999” to impute the OQ and ROC share of merchandise
GDP. I calculate that the OQ export share is 0.962, and the ROC export share is 0.796.
Vertical specialization
According to HIY, the vertical specialization share of merchandise exports for Canada in 1990
was 0.27. I calculated the OQ and ROC vertical specialization shares as follows: I use the 1990
industry-level vertical specialization numbers from the working paper version of HIY. From “In-
terprovincial Trade in Canada, 1984-1996” I calculate OQ’s share of Canada’s exports industry
by industry. I then multiply the former by the latter to get a measure of total OQ vertical spe-
cialization, which I normalize by dividing by OQ’s total merchandise exports. I follow the same
procedure for the ROC. OQ’s vertical specialization share is 0.333; the ROC vertical specialization
share is 0.144. The OQ VS share of exports is larger than for ROC, because it is where almost
all auto production occurs; auto production accounts for about half of all of Canada’s vertical
specialization.
26The parameterization and calibration do not focus on matching intra-national trade. In the third simulation, it
would be possible to either calibrate the transport cost between Ontario-Quebec and the Rest of Canada to match
trade between these two regions, or take a stand on the distance costs between these two regions, and assess if the
model’s implication for trade between these two regions matches the data.
27This seems like a high number, but note that gross output, of which exports are a part, is about 2.5 times larger
than value-added or GDP.
214.2 Solution
Solving the model is complicated, even when employing the Frechét distribution. Unlike in the
EK model, in which the exact solution can be found, in my vertical specialization model, I must
ﬁnd an approximate solution. To do so, I approximate the [0,1] continuum with 1,000,000 equally
spaced intervals, with each interval corresponding to one good.28 For each good and region, I
draw a stage-one productivity and a stage-two productivity from the Frechét distribution. Because
there are four regions and two stages of production, there are 16 possible production methods for
each good. Given a candidate vector of regional wages, I calculate for each region’s consumer
the cheapest production method (i.e., the locations of stage-1 and stage-2 production) for each
of the 1,000,000 goods. I then calculate whether the resulting pattern of specialization and trade
is consistent with labor market equilibrium (or, equivalently, balanced trade). The model uses
a simple Gauss-Newton algorithm to adjust wages until labor market equilibrium in each of the
regions is achieved.
As described above, I solve for the trade barriers and productivities that enable the model to
match the data on Canada’s wages, trade shares, and/or vertical specialization. With the trade
barriers and productivities, and with the distance costs assumption, the border barrier can be
inferred. I solve the model again under no border barriers, and then use the two solutions to
calculate Canada’s border eﬀect: the ratio of within-country trade under border barriers to within-
country trade under free trade divided by the ratio of international trade under border barriers to
international trade under free trade.
5R e s u l t s
I present the key results from each simulation.29 In the ﬁrst simulation, I solve for the productivity
parameter T and trade barrier τ that allows the model to match Canada’s relative (to the U.S.)
wage rate and Canada’s export share of GDP. These values are listed in Table 3. An international
trade cost of just 15.3 percent is needed to capture the two facts. By contrast AvW estimate
international trade costs to be 91 percent. From the diﬀerence in trade costs, it would not be
28An alternative approach is to set up the model to handle an integer number of goods and apply programming
techniques to solve for it exactly.
29I focus on international trade and vertical specialization. There are implications for intra-national vertical
specialization, of course. In all three simulations, the model-implied intra-national vertical specialization exceeds
international vertical specialization under border barriers, consistent with the data.
22surprising to see a much smaller border eﬀect. Table 3 shows that this is the case. The border
eﬀect is just 2.7. When distance costs are 10 percent instead of the benchmark 5 percent, the
border eﬀect is even smaller.
I also examine a simulation in which the elasticity is 10. The model-implied trade cost is now
only about 7 percent. The higher elasticity implies that the impact of distance costs on trade is
now approximately twice as large. To oﬀset this, I set distance costs to be just 2.5 percent. In this
scenario, the border eﬀect is 2.6, virtually the same as when the elasticity is ﬁve. AvW noted that
the border eﬀect estimates were essentially invariant to the assumption about the elasticity. This
result apparently carries over to my framework.
A large source of the diﬀerence between my border eﬀect number and those of AvW, EK, and
others is the magniﬁcation eﬀect from the vertical specialization in my model. To see this, it is
constructive to calibrate the EK model to match the same two facts. The EK model links the work
of AvW and others with my work, because it is a Ricardian trade model, because I use the same
Frechét distribution that they use, and because it allows for intermediate goods trade. Using the
same elasticity, labor force size, and the share of intermediates in production, I solve the EK model
for the T and τ that match the relative wage rate and export share. I ﬁnd that the international
trade cost is 69.2 percent, more than four times larger than in my model.30
When distance costs are 5 percent, the border eﬀect from the EK model is 9.4, close to the
AvW estimate. A large fraction of the border eﬀect “gap” between my model and the EK model
is simply because the implied border barrier is smaller in my model, so much so that despite the
magniﬁcation eﬀect, the border eﬀect in my model is also smaller. The appendix shows analytically
for the vertical specialization special case discussed above that for a given trade share,m ym o d e l
will deliver a lower border barrier and border eﬀect than the EK model.
In the above simulation, the implication for Canada’s international vertical specialization is
counterfactual. The model implies that it is about 9 percent, which is only one-third of its actual
value. For the model to imply greater vertical specialization, two possible adjustments are to
increase the heterogeneity in productivities, i.e., lower the elasticity, or to lower trade costs. Both
of these would help increase the number of goods for which internationally vertically specialized
production is the most eﬃcient process. However, changing these speciﬁcations would also raise
30This number is actually very close to the EK trade cost measure for an elasticity of 5 when the distance between
the two countries is on the interval [375,750] miles, the two countries share a border and a language, and in which
the destination is the United States. With these characteristics, the implied barrier is about 58 percent.
23the model’s implication for the export share of GDP to counterfactually high levels.
Consequently, in order to match both the vertical specialization and the export share data, an
alternative adjustment is introduced — heterogeneity in trade costs — so that some goods face low
enough trade costs that vertical specialization will occur, while other goods face high enough trade
costs to preclude much trade. This is what I do in the second simulation. It can be justiﬁed on
two empirical grounds. First, as mentioned above, industry-level estimates generate a wide range
of border eﬀects — from one to 100, roughly — which suggests the presence of diﬀerential trade costs
across types of goods.31 Second, for the case of Canada, motor vehicles account for almost one-half
of total vertical specialization. Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998) suggest that this resulted from
the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact of 1965, which eliminated all tariﬀs on motor vehicle trade by U.S. and
Canadian manufacturers.
As discussed in the previous section, I specify one-third of the goods to be low trade cost goods,
while the remainder are high trade cost goods. I solve for these two trade costs, as well as the
relative mean productivities, to match Canada’s vertical specialization, trade share, and relative
wage. Table 4 presents the results. Note the extreme variation in the trade costs across the two
sets of goods. The low cost goods face a trade barrier of just 1.2 percent, while the high cost goods
face a trade barrier of 56.2 percent. Put simply, the low cost barrier is what helps generate vertical
specialization, and the high cost barrier is what helps ensure that Canada’s trade share is not too
high. Because two-thirds of the goods face the high barrier, the goods-weighted average of these
two costs is 37.9 percent. However, the model implies that about 61 percent of Canada’s trade is
in the low cost goods; an import-weighted average of these two trade costs is just 22.5 percent.
To assess the border eﬀect from this simulation, I assume that the low cost goods face no border
barriers; these goods are already essentially traded in a free-trade zone. For the high cost goods, I
continue to assume that distance costs are 5 percent. These assumptions imply a (import-weighted)
border barrier of 19.0 percent. Table 4 shows that the border eﬀect is 5.03. This is about half of
the AvW estimate and of my estimate from the EK model. If distance costs are 10 percent, the
implied border eﬀect is 3.6.
How much of an increase in international trade would occur if border barriers were eliminated?
The model implies that United States-Canada trade would rise by 44 percent, a signiﬁcant amount,
but, again, about one-half of what AvW obtain for their multi-country model, an increase of 79
31See Hillberry (2002), for example.
24percent.32
I also examine the consequences of the assumption that one-third of the goods are low trade
cost goods by conducting two further simulations, one with one-half of the goods and one with one-
fourth of the goods treated as low trade cost goods. The implications in terms of import-weighted
trade costs and border eﬀects are essentially the same, with the former delivering a trade cost of
20.2 percent and a border eﬀect of 4.8, and the latter yielding a trade cost of 22.5 percent and a
border eﬀect of 5.1.
The two preceding simulations treated regions within Canada as symmetric. Ontario and Que-
bec are the manufacturing centers of Canada, accounting for 77 percent of manufacturing shipments
in 1990. In the ﬁve key industries mentioned before, the two provinces account for almost 90 per-
cent of shipments. By contrast, the rest of Canada is focused more on ﬁshing, forestry, mining, and
agriculture. These diﬀerences in production are captured in the fact that OQ have a higher trade
share of GDP and a considerably higher vertical specialization share — again, mainly owing to the
presence of the motor vehicle industry in Ontario.
In the last simulation, the goal is to match the trade share and international vertical spe-
cialization share of OQ and ROC. To do so, I allow for the two regions to have diﬀerent mean
productivities and a diﬀerent pair of high and low trade costs. Now, there are six equations to
nail down six parameters. Table 2 presents the values of the variables to be matched, and Table
5 presents the model-calibrated parameters. The trade cost numbers are broadly similar to those
in the previous simulation. Note that the low trade cost for OQ is slightly negative. This means
that for one-third of the goods, the combination of the border barrier and distance costs to the
United States is less than distance cost to the rest of OQ and to the rest of Canada. Given the
concentration of Ontario’s auto manufacturing industry near Windsor, Canada, this outcome does
not seem too surprising. The low cost trade barrier for the ROC is about 8 percent. In both
regions, the high cost barrier continues to be on the order of about 60 percent. In OQ, more than
two-thirds of imports are of the low-cost goods, while less than half of imports are of low cost goods
in the ROC. Consequently, the import-weighted trade costs are 17.3 percent and 33.5 percent, re-
spectively. Because OQ accounts for about 2/3 of total Canada imports, the overall model-implied
import-weighted trade cost for Canada is 22.6 percent.
T u r n i n gt ob o r d e re ﬀects, I again assume that the low cost goods are essentially in a free trade
zone and that the high cost goods face distance costs of 5 percent. This implies a U.S.-Canada
32AvW’s two-country model would imply an increase in U.S.-Canada trade of about 150 percent.
25border barrier of 19.3 percent. In this environment, Table 5 shows that the border eﬀect is 5.2,
similar to the value in the previous simulation. If border barriers were eliminated, U.S.-Canada
trade would rise 46 percent.
Focusing on the second two calibrated simulations, the main lessons are: Trade costs between
the U.S. and Canada are about 23 percent. The Canada border eﬀect in 1990 is about ﬁve, less
than half of AvW’s estimates, and closer to the estimates that take into account heterogeneity in
border barriers across goods. In addition, the predicted increase in U.S.-Canada trade resulting
from the elimination of border barriers is about 45 percent, a signiﬁcant, but not earth-shattering,
amount. Why is this? A key part of the model-based calibration is that is that it must explain
existing vertical specialization. Given the elasticity, the only way the model can generate a large
vertical specialization share for Canada is if the international trade costs facing some goods is low.
But if these costs are low, then the further trade increases from eliminating border barriers are
limited, as well.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The main quantitative result of this paper is that a model of international and intra-national trade
with endogenous vertical specialization, calibrated so that it matches the 1990 data on Canada’s
relative wage with the United States, as well as Canada’s exports and vertical specialization, gen-
erates trade barrier and border eﬀect estimates that are about half of the numbers estimated in the
literature. For an elasticity of ﬁve, the import-weighted U.S.-Canada trade cost is about 23 percent,
(the border barrier is about 19 percent) and Canada’s border eﬀect is about ﬁve. These numbers
go a long way toward resolving the border eﬀect puzzle. Among studies that have examined the
U.S.-Canada border eﬀect, only Hillberry (2002) has obtained numbers this small, and his approach
emphasizes heterogeneity in barriers across goods, as I do here.
Vertical specialization plays a key role in this result. The presence or possibility of vertically
specialized production magniﬁes the costs of border barriers. This is due to two complementary
mechanisms, each of which magniﬁes the eﬀect of a border barrier. First, the “back and forth” trade
associated with vertical specialization means that at least some stages of production bear multiple
border costs. Second, because diﬀerent stages can be produced in diﬀerent countries, sometimes
the last stage of production is the “marginal” production process. Then the relevant border cost
is not the cost relative to the total cost of the good, but the cost relative to the cost of producing
26the marginal stage. Because the costs of border barriers are magniﬁed, and because Canada had
as i g n i ﬁcant amount of international vertical specialization — 27 percent of exports — in 1990, then
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a ts o m eg o o d sf a c ev e r ys m a l lt r ade barriers (relative to intra-national trade
barriers). I parameterize the fraction of goods facing small trade barriers to be one-third. For these
goods, the model implies that the value of the barrier is close to zero, and they account for about
three-ﬁfths of Canada’s imports.
The ﬂip side of relatively small trade costs, border barriers, and border eﬀects is a relatively
small increase in trade if the border barriers were eliminated. The model indicates that U.S.-Canada
trade would increase about 45 percent. My numbers may even be overestimates, because they are
based on an international distance cost (relative to intra-national distance costs) of just 5 percent.
If the international distance cost was 10 percent, then the Canada border eﬀect is less than four
and the implied growth in trade if border barriers were eliminated is about 35 percent. Last, it
is likely that since the full implementation of the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement and NAFTA,
border barriers are smaller today than in 1990. All of this suggests that the United States and
Canada are fairly highly integrated with one another, and that there may not be enormous gains
from trade if remaining border barriers were eliminated.
Vertical specialization breaks the tight link between the elasticity of trade with respect to
iceberg-type trade barriers and the elasticity of substitution between goods on either the production
or consumption side, as in EK, as well as monopolistic competition or Armington aggregator models.
In many models the two elasticities are virtually identical. In a special case of the model, I
demonstrate that the elasticity of trade with respect to barriers involves both the elasticity of
substitution (i.e., the Frechét distribution variance parameter) and the share of stage-1 inputs in
stage-2 production. This suggests that there may be an upward bias in estimates of the substitution
elasticity that do not control for vertical specialization. Chaney (2005) also presents a model
that breaks the link between the elasticity of trade with respect to barriers and the elasticity of
substitition.
The fact that the border barrier implied by my model is on the order of 20 percent or less
surely must make the task of identifying and measuring these barriers — whether they are currency,
regulatory, cultural, or other costs — easier. This is an important task for future research.
In my framework, the trade and distance costs enter in an ad valorem way. Recent empirical
research suggests the importance of ﬁxed or sunk costs in international trade costs.33 It would be
33See Roberts and Tybout (1997), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004),
27useful to extend the framework to include ﬁxed costs of exporting, as in Chaney (2005) and Melitz
(2003). If ﬁxed costs are increasing in the number of border crossings, it seems plausible that
vertical specialization can generate magniﬁcation eﬀects along the lines obtained with ad valorem
costs.
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Solution for zh in standard model
For each good consumed in the home country, there are two production methods: it can be produced
at home or abroad. Following DFS by ordering the continuum of goods according to declining
home country comparative advantage, there is a cutoﬀ zh for which goods on the interval [0,zh ]
are produced by the home country, and goods on the interval [zh,1] are produced by the foreign
country. This cutoﬀ is determined by the arbitrage condition that the price of purchasing this good
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(1 + b) (26)
Solving for zh yields (17).
A.2 Solution for zh in vertical specialization model special case
For goods ultimately consumed in the home country, there are two production methods, HH and
HF. As above, ordering the continuum of goods according to declining home country comparative
advantage in stage 2 production, there is a cutoﬀ zh for which goods on the interval [0,zh ] are
produced by HH, and goods on the interval [zh,1] are produced by HF. This cutoﬀ is determined
by the arbitrage condition that the price of purchasing this good (by a home country consumer) is
the same across the two methods:
pHH









2(zh )1−θ ≡ (1 + b)pHF
2 (zh ) (27)
for example.

















(1 + b)(1+θ) (29)
Solving for zh yields (21).
A.3 Border eﬀect with vertical specialization when barriers are value-added
When border barriers such as tariﬀs are applied only to the value-added that occurred in the
exporting country, then (27) now becomes:
pHH
2 (zh ) ≡ (1 + b(1 − θ))pHF
2 (zh ) (30)
Solving for zh as before, and then plugging it into the expression for the border eﬀect yields:
h
(1 + b)θ(1 + b(1 − θ))
i n
1−θ (31)
When θ ≥ 1/2, (31) is clearly greater than (1 + b)n.W h e n0 <θ<1/2,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
f(θ)=
£
(1 + b)θ(1 + b(1 − θ))
¤ 1
1−θ − (1 + b),f o rw h i c hf(0) = 0 and f(0.5) > 0,i sc o n c a v e .T h i s
implies that for this range of θ, (31) exceeds (1 + b)n. Hence, the magniﬁcation eﬀect still holds.





With this approximation, it can be seen that the 1+θ
1−θ term from the “gross” barrier case is
replaced by 1
1−θ. This is intuitive, because θ is the stage-1 portion that is taxed twice in the gross
case.
A.4 Comparing the vertical specialization special case to the EK model
In this exercise, I ask the following question. For a given trade share, and under the same assump-
tions as in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, what are the border barrier and border eﬀect implications of
the vertical specialization model relative to the EK model? In the vertical specialization model,
the export share of GDP is given by (1 + θ)(1 − zh
v). In the EK model for the case in which all
29goods are tradable, the export share of GDP is given by
1−zh
ek
1−θ .I nb o t hm o d e l s ,θ is the share of





1 − θ2 (33)




1−θ) =( 1+bek)n(1 − θ2) − θ2 (34)
It is easy to see then that the border eﬀect in the vertical specialization model is less than the
border eﬀect in the EK model, (1 + bek)n. It can also be shown that the border barrier bv in the
vertical specialization model is less than the barrier bek i nt h eE Km o d e l .
References
[1] Anderson, James E. and van Wincoop, Eric. “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border
Puzzle.” American Economic Review, March 2003, 93 (1), 170-192.
[2] Anderson, James E. and van Wincoop, Eric. “Trade Costs.” Journal of Economic Literature,
September 2004, 42, 691-751.
[3] Anderson, Michael and Smith, Stephen. “Do National Borders Really Matter? Canada-U.S.
Regional Trade Reconsidered.” Review of International Economics, 1999, 7 (2), 219-227.
[4] Baier, Scott and Bergstrand, Jeﬀrey. “The Growth of World Trade: Tariﬀs, Transport Costs,
and Income Similarity.” Journal of International Economics, 2001, 53, 1-27.
[5] Chaney, Thomas. “Distorted Gravity: Heterogeneous Firms, Market Structure, and the Geog-
raphy of International Trade.” Manuscript, MIT, January 2005.
[6] Chen, Natalie. “Intra-national versus International Trade in the European Union: Why Do
National Borders Matter?” Journal of International Economics, 2004, 63, 93-118.
[7] Combes, Pierre-Philippe; Lafourcade, Miren, and Thierry Mayer. “The Trade-Creating Eﬀects
of Business and Social Networks: Evidence from France.” Journal of International Economics,
2005, 66, 1-29.
30[8] Dornbusch, Rudiger; Fischer, Stanley and Paul Samuelson. “Comparative Advantage, Trade,
and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods.” American Economic Review,
1977, 67, 823-839.
[9] Eaton, Jonathan and Kortum, Samuel. “Technology, Geography, and Trade.” Econometrica,
September 2002, 70 (5), 1741-1779.
[10] Evans, Carolyn. “The Economic Signiﬁcance of National Border Eﬀects.” American Economic
Review, September 2003a, 93 (4), 1291-1312.
[11] Evans, Carolyn. “Border Eﬀects and the Availability of Domestic Products Abroad.” Manu-
script, Federal Reserve Board. 2003b.
[12] Head, Keith and Mayer, Thierry. “Illusory Border Eﬀects: Distance Mismeasurement Inﬂates
Estimates of Home Bias in Trade.” Manuscript, CEPII, January 2002.
[13] Helliwell, John. How Much Do National Borders Matter? Washington D.C.: Brookings Insti-
tution Press, 1998.
[14] Helliwell, John and Verdier, Genevieve. “Measuring Internal Trade Distances: A New Method
Applied to Estimate Provincial Border Eﬀects in Canada.” The Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics, November 2001, 34 (4), 1024-41.
[15] Helpman, Elhanan; Melitz, Marc, and Stephen Yeaple. “Exports Versus FDI with Heteroge-
neous Firms.” American Economic Review, March 2004, 300-316.
[16] Hillberry, Russell H. “Aggregation Bias, Compositional Change, and the Border Eﬀect.” Cana-
dian Journal of Economics, August 2002, 517-530.
[17] Hillberry, Russell H. and Hummels, David. “Trade Responses to Geographic Frictions: A
Decomposition Using Micro-Data” NBER WP 11339, May 2005.
[18] Hummels, David; Ishii, Jun and Kei-Mu Yi. “The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization
in World Trade.” Journal of International Economics, June 2001, 54, 75-96.
[19] Hummels, David and Klenow, Peter J. “The Variety and Quality of a Nation’s Exports.”
October 2004, forthcoming, American Economic Review.
31[20] Hummels, David; Rapoport, Dana and Kei-Mu Yi. “Vertical Specialization and the Changing
Nature of World Trade.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, June
1998, 59-79.
[21] McCallum, John. “National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns.” Ameri-
can Economic Review, June 1995, 85, 615-623.
[22] Melitz, Marc J. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity.” Econometrica, November 2003, 71 (6), 1695-1725.
[23] Nitsch, Volker. “National Borders and International Trade: Evidence from the European
Union.” Canadian Journal of Economics, November 2000, 33 (4), 1091-1105.
[24] Obstfeld, Maurice and Rogoﬀ, Kenneth. “The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeco-
nomics: Is There a Common Cause?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 2001, 339-389.
[25] Roberts, Mark and Tybout, James. “The Decision to Export in Colombia: An Empirical Model
of Entry with Sunk Costs.” American Economic Review, September 1997, 545-564.
[26] Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban. “A Spatial Theory of Trade.” forthcoming, American Economic
Review.
[27] Wei, Shang-Jin. “Intra-national versus Inter-national Trade: How Stubborn Are Nations in
Global Integration?” NBER Working Paper 5531, 1996.
[28] Yi, Kei-Mu. “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?” Journal of



























DD DF FD FF











DD DF FD FF
Share of Total VS
Note: VS exports = 33% (47%) of total merchandise exports in 1963 (1987)
DF: Domestic imported inputs; exports to Foreign destinations








Figure 30.5 0 1
H                 F
Note: Symmetric case (identical productivity distributions and labor); border barrier = 10%; 





International Production Specialization: 
Standard model
0.72 0 1
H                                 F
Figure 4
(H)0.25 00 . 5 1
H1 H2
Note: Symmetric case (identical productivity distributions and labor); border barrier = 10%; 





Intra-national Production Specialization: 
Standard model




H                 F
Note: Symmetric case (identical productivity distributions and labor); border barrier = 10%; 





International Production Specialization: 
Vertical specialization case 
0.95 0 1
H                                 F
Figure 6
(H)TABLE 1
VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION AT THE STATE LEVEL
STATE Year Vertical Specialization












Canada 1990 27.0%TABLE 2




Stage 1 share in stage 2 production 0.62 0.62 0.62
Labor 
Ontario-Quebec 4.5 4.5 5.67
Rest of Canada 4.5 4.5 3.33
U.S. 100 100 100
Within country transport costs 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fraction of goods with low international transport costs 1/3 1/3
Values of Variables Used to Calibrate Productivity and Trade Costs
Wage
Canada wage relative to United States (manufacturing) 0.88 0.88
Ontario-Quebec relative wage 0.88
Rest of Canada relative wage 0.88
Trade (merchandise export share of merchandise GDP)
Canada 0.910 0.910
Ontario-Quebec 0.962
Rest of Canada  0.796
Vertical Specialization (share of merchandise exports)
Canada 0.270
Ontario-Quebec 0.333
Rest of Canada  0.144TABLE 3
Simulation One:
Symmetric Regions, Homogeneous Trade Costs
Mean Productivity (relative to U.S.) 1.08
International trade cost  15.3%
Border Effects:
5 percent distance cost 2.70
Increase in U.S.-Canada trade if border barrier was eliminated 36.3%
10 percent distance cost 1.57
Increase in U.S.-Canada trade if border barrier was eliminated 16.0%
Elasticity =10 (2.5 percent distance costs) 2.58
EK model (5 percent distance costs) 9.40
Note: Productivity and trade cost solved to fit Canada export share of GDP and relative wage.  Productivity is size-adjusted.
International trade cost is relative to intra-national trade costTABLE 4
Simulation Two:
Symmetric Regions, Heterogeneous Trade Costs
Mean Productivity (relative to U.S.) 0.99
Low International trade cost  1.21%
High International trade cost 56.18%
Import-weighted trade cost 22.52%
Border Effects:
5 percent distance cost 5.03
Increase in U.S.-Canada trade if border barrier was eliminated 44.2%
10 percent distance cost 3.62
Increase in U.S.-Canada trade if border barrier was eliminated 33.6%
Note: Productivity and trade costs solved to match Canada's international vertical specialization share, trade share, 
and relative wage. Productivity is size-adjusted. International trade costs are relative to intra-national costs.TABLE 5
Simulation Three:
Heterogeneous Regions, Heterogeneous Trade Costs
OQ Productivity (relative to U.S.) 0.88
OQ: Low international trade cost -1.61%
OQ: High international trade cost 63.29%
OQ: Import-weighted trade cost 17.29%
ROC Productivity (relative to U.S.) 1.17
ROC: Low international trade cost 7.99%
ROC: High international trade cost 55.10%
ROC: Import-weighted trade cost 33.47%
Border Effects:
5 percent distance cost 5.22
Increase in U.S.-Canada trade if border barrier was eliminated 45.7%
10 percent distance cost 3.72
Increase in U.S.-Canada trade if border barrier was eliminated 35.6%
Note: Productivity and trade costs solved to match OQ's and ROC's international vertical specialization share,  
trade share and relative wage. Productivity is size-adjusted. International trade costs are  
relative to intranational costs.